# $\label{eq:Discussion of:} Discussion \ of: \\ \mbox{Equilibrium Cross-Section of Returns}$

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#### The Basic Idea:

- Empirically, the CAPM has a hard time explaining size and book-to-market effects.
  - Size and book-to-market appear to capture separate riskfactors.

Gomes, Kogan and Zhang develop a model in which:

- 1. Firm value is attributable to assets-in-place and growth options.
  - Firm size is a proxy for the fraction of a firm's value that is attributable to assets-in-place.
    - Growth options are riskier (higher  $\beta$ ) than assets-inplace, so in the model small firms have more growth options, and hence are riskier and earn higher returns in equilibrium.
  - Book-to-market is a proxy for the profitability of a firm's assets-in-place
    - Higher book-to-market firms have lower current profitability, but higher  $\beta$ , so they earn higher returns in equilibrium.
- 2. Conditional CAPM expains size/book-to-market premia.

#### The Model

#### Household Sector:

- Representative Household with Power Utility
  - CRRA=  $\gamma$
- No labor income; no frictions.

#### **Production Sector:**

#### 1. Projects:

- Projects Arrive Randomly
  - Arrival Process is the same for all firms: large, small, growth, or value.
- Project Cashflows are:

$$= X_{i,t} \cdot k_i = exp(x_t) \cdot \epsilon_{i,t} \cdot k_i$$

- $-x_t$ ,  $\epsilon_{i,t}$  are economy-wide and firm-specific productivity processes they are independent mean reverting processes.
- $-k_i$  is project scale, which is same across firms.
- Projects expire randomly Poisson process with (common) arrival rate  $\delta$ .
- ullet Cost of initiation  $e_{i,t}$  differs across projects.

#### 2. Firms:

- Firm value is the sum of the ongoing projects ("assets-in-place"), and potential new projects ("growth-options")
- Firms invest optimally no asymmetric information or agency problems.
- ullet Within a firm,  $\epsilon_{i,t}$  is identical across projects

#### Firm Value Decomposition

Firm Value is:

$$V_{ft} = \underbrace{\int_{\mathcal{I}_{ft}} \frac{k_i}{K_t} \left[ \widetilde{V}_t^a(\epsilon_{it} - 1) + V_t^a \right] di}_{V_{ft}^a} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\int_{\mathcal{F}} 1 df} V_t^o}_{V_{ft}^o}$$

#### There are three components:

- 1.  $\frac{1}{K_t}V_t^a$  is the value of one extra unit of scale, for an average firm.
  - ullet  $\frac{k_i}{K_t}V_t^a$  would be the value of its assets-in-place, were it an average firm.
- 2.  $\frac{1}{K_t}\widetilde{V}_t^a$  is the extra value per unit of scale a firm gains per unit of firm-specific productivity  $(\epsilon_{it})$ .
- 3.  $V_{ft}^o$  is the value of the firm's growth options this is identical across firms.

### Firm Value Decomposition - Graphically

#### Firm Beta Decomposition

The firm's  $\beta$  is a weighted average of the  $\beta$ s of the assets-in-place and the growth options:

$$\beta_{ft} = \frac{V_{ft}^a}{V_{ft}} \beta_{ft}^a + \frac{V_{ft}^o}{V_{ft}} \beta_{ft}^o + \frac{V_{ft}^o}{V_{ft}} \beta_{ft}^o$$

$$= \widetilde{\beta}_t^a + \frac{V_{ft}^a}{V_{ft}} (\beta_t^a - \widetilde{\beta}_t^a) + \frac{V_{ft}^o}{V_{ft}} (\beta_t^o - \widetilde{\beta}_t^a)$$

$$= \widetilde{\beta}_t^a + \frac{K_{ft}}{V_{ft}} (\frac{K_t}{V_t^a})^{-1} (\beta_t^a - \widetilde{\beta}_t^a) + \frac{V_{ft}^o}{V_{ft}} (\beta_t^o - \widetilde{\beta}_t^a)$$

#### where:

- 1.  $\widetilde{\beta}_t^a$  is the average  $\beta$  of assets-in-place in the economy (i.e., the beta of  $\widetilde{V}_t^a$ ).
- 2.  $\beta_t^a$  is the incremental beta due to the higher productivity (i.e., the beta of  $V_t^a$ ).
- 3.  $\beta_t^o$  is the beta of growth options.
- The last term shows that small firms will have higher beta if  $\beta^o_t \widetilde{\beta}^a_t$ .
  - Since growth options are levered, they should have higher betas.
- $\bullet$  The second term shows that high book-to-market firms will have higher betas if  $\beta^a_t \widetilde{\beta}^a_t$ 
  - That is, if the betas of higher productivity firms are lower than of lower productivity firms.

#### Additional Model Implications:

Some model implications are inconsistent with empirical findings:

- 1. Market Sharpe Ratio relatively constant over time:
  - The simulation generates considerable variation in expected market return
  - However, there is simultaneous large variability in the market return volatity – the market sharpe ratio is relatively constant.
  - Empirically, we see dramatic variation in the market Sharpe ratio.
- 2. Market is MVE portfolio:
  - MacKinlay (1995) shows that combinations of Fama-French SMB, HML and Mkt portfolios generate Sharpe-ratios far in excess of market's.
- 3. High Variability in Consumption Growth:
  - To generate high Sharpe ratios with power utility, you need counterfactually high consumption growth variance:

$$\frac{\sigma_m}{E[m]} = \frac{E[R_{MVE}] - r_f}{\sigma_{MVE}}$$
$$\gamma \sigma_{cg} \approx SR_{MVE}$$

- 4. Physical size (as opposed to Market Equity) forecasts future returns:
  - Berk (2000) finds that, empirically, physical size measures don't forecast future returns.

## Can a Conditional CAPM Explain the Data?

• The Conditional CAPM implies that:

$$E_{t-1}[R_{i,t}^e] = \beta_{i,t-1} E_{t-1}[R_{vw,t}^e]$$

 Taking unconditional expectations, and using the definition of the covariance:

$$E[R_{i,t}^e] = E[\beta_{i,t-1}] \cdot E[R_{vw,t}^e] + cov(\beta_{i,t-1}, E_{t-1}[R_{vw,t}^e])$$

• However, if we test the CAPM unconditionally:

$$E[R_{i,t}^e] = \alpha_i^{\mathsf{uncond}} + E[\beta_{i,t-1}] \cdot E[R_{vw,t}^e]$$

we may reject the CAPM (find  $\alpha_i^{\text{uncond}} \neq 0$ ) even though the conditional CAPM holds.

- For example, it could be that, for the Fama-French HML portfolio,  $cov(\beta_{HML,t-1}, E_{t-1}[R^e_{vw,t}])$  is large.
- However, this would imply that:

$$\alpha_{HML}^{\mathsf{uncond}} = -cov(\beta_{HML,t-1}, E_{t-1}[R_{vw,t}^e])$$

and, using the triangle inequality:

$$\sigma_{\beta} \ge \frac{\alpha}{\sigma(E[R_{VW}])}$$

• The standard deviation in conditional beta that is required to satisfy this inequality is about 0.7 (/quarter), but empirically  $\sigma_{\beta} < 0.1$ .

#### **Conclusions:**

- Beautifully done model
- However, some implications seem inconsistent with other empirical findings:
  - 1. Power utility specification can't simultaneously explain high equity premium and premium variability, and low and steady consumption growth volatility (Campbell and Cochrane (1999)).
    - This variability is also necessary to explain cross sectional results.
  - 2. Model doesn't capture high Sharpe-ratios possible with value and size strategies.
  - 3. Book-to-market story seems tenuous.
    - Model implies that higher book-to-market firms have higher future dividend/profit growth.
    - Book-to-market risk effect story should be firmed up.
  - 4. Required level and business-cycle variability in small and value firm risk  $(\beta_{i,t})$  doesn't seem to be there, empirically.

#### References

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